













Theoretical Issues and Oppositional Politics in  














The views presented in this paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Asia Research Centre or Murdoch University. 
© Copyright is held by the author(s) of each working paper: No part of this publication may be 
republished, reprinted or reproduced in any form without the permission of the paper’s author(s). 
 





Two decades ago political opposition in various parts of East and Southeast Asia was primarily 
characterised by peasant insurgencies and radical student movements questioning the very basis 
of the capitalist path to development. Their campaigns were often conducted outside 
constitutional processes. In the last decade, however, capitalism and industrialisation has firmly 
taken root in the region and capitalism’s ascendancy is not in question. As a consequence, the 
nature of political opposition, the forms through which it is conducted, and the actors involved 
have undergone a transformation. Extra-constitutional challenges are limited and the 
predominant agendas of political oppositions in the region have decidedly narrowed to more 
reformist goals. The new reformers are drawn from new social forces generated by the very 
processes of rapid capitalist industrialisation, including elements from across a range of classes: 
bourgeois, middle and working classes. To differing extents and by varying means, they are 
shaping the contests over power in the region’s dynamic societies. 
Also in the last decade, the demise of various dictatorships or military regimes and the 
establishment or resurrection of elections in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia have 
prompted a spate of works questioning the long-term viability of authoritarian rule in general. A 
host of writers began enthusiastically documenting and analysing what was generally 
characterised as ‘democratisation’. A significant component of this literature involves 
reconsideration of the relationship between economic development and political change. This 
has been fuelled to no small degree by recent political transformations in the newly-
industrialising countries (NICs), notably those of the comparatively mature industrial 
economies of South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Would these winds of change soon be 
repeated in authoritarian societies elsewhere undergoing rapid industrialisation?   
This question was answered with an enthusiastic affirmative by modernisation theorists 
whose credibility had taken a battering. Earlier they had depicted market economies and liberal 
democratic polities as mutually-reinforcing, but the development experience of the late 
industrialising countries of Asia and Latin America had been at odds with this proposition. The 
sudden political upheavals provided an opportunity for these theorists to salvage something 
from the debate. To be sure, contemporary modernisation accounts of the causal link between 
capitalist development and political change are more sophisticated and qualified than previous 
attempts. They came in the wake of the influential thesis on transitions from authoritarian rule 
by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986), which 
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rejected any general theory of social or economic determination of political outcomes in favour 
of voluntarist approaches which emphasised the importance of agency and processes of 
negotiation and strategy-building. Variables such as culture, institutions and political 
leadership, for example, are seen in the revised modernisation literature to complicate the 
forward march of ‘democracy’ and mediate the political effects of economic development (Pye 
1985; Huntington 1991; Lipset 1993, 1990; Marks 1992; Diamond 1989, 1993; Case 1994).
1 
The emphases vary somewhat within this framework, but economic development is 
nevertheless understood to generate fundamental changes in social structure, including the 
creation of an extensive and diverse middle class, that exert pressures for political pluralism. At 
the very least, authoritarian regimes will become increasingly difficult to reproduce according 
to these analysts. 
 Modernisation theorists have not been alone in prophesising problems for authoritarian 
regimes experiencing the advent of accelerated economic development. Literature on 
‘developmental authoritarianism’ argues that late industrialising countries require a stage of 
authoritarian rule to kick-off industrial growth, but after the initial phase this political regime 
constrains capitalism. Marxists have also argued that authoritarian regimes are ill-suited to the 
task of resolving frictions between competing fractions of capital in more advanced phases of 
capital accumulation (Harris 1986). They too point to changing centres of economic and social 
power including a strategically-important middle class of professionals and technicians who 
have economic independence from the state (Robison 1986). The attainment of bourgeois 
hegemony in the social and economic spheres lessens the need for coercive political structures. 
  Debates about the continued feasibility of authoritarian rule in late industrialising 
countries have been influenced by broader events and intellectual trends. With the dramatic 
collapse of various Eastern European socialist regimes, presiding over economic decay rather 
than economic buoyancy, the Cold War was suddenly defunct. For some, the momentous turn 
of events culminated in the unquestionable triumph of liberalism, a veritable end of history 
(Fukuyama 1992a). In this context, state-centred analyses came under fire for deflecting 
attention from important social phenomena which lay behind the unpredicted speed and extent 
of transformation in Eastern Europe. A related resurgence of analytical interest in the concept of 
civil society amongst liberal theorists has been joined by Marxists and other critical theorists 
looking beyond the state. The decline of state socialism brought with it disclosures about the 
extent of repression and abuse of office which embarrassed many socialist scholars. In political 
terms, this has led to a new emphasis on decentralisation and non-state forms of organisation. In 
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analytical terms, it has steered theorists towards usages of the concept of civil society that differ 
significantly from Marx himself. 
Against the above background, two very powerful themes are discernible in this vast 
body of literature on political change in late industrialising countries of East and Southeast 
Asia. The first of these is a propensity to equate the challenge to, or demise of, authoritarian 
rule with the advance of ‘democracy’. This concept is generally employed unproblematically, 
but implicitly endorses a liberal democratic or formalistic definition of the term. For some 
writers, the existence of elections appears to be the benchmark of ‘democracy’, for others a 
more detailed conception of competitive party politics is articulated. But extra-parliamentary 
activity not servicing formal political institutions is under-theorised. At a time when popular 
participation and interest in political parties appears to have waned in established liberal 
democracies whilst social movements and interest associations disengaged from the formal 
political process gather momentum (see Schmitter and Karl 1991: 80), we should surely remain 
circumspect about oppositional forms elsewhere. Much of this literature is consistent with a 
linear conception of history, sitting comfortably with Fukuyama’s notion of liberalism’s 
imminent global triumph.  
This does not mean writers, including Fukuyama himself, have entirely dismissed the 
possibility that political change in late industrialising countries of Asia or elsewhere might 
deviate from the liberal democratic model. But liberal democracy remains the point of reference 
for these analyses, deviations from it explained in terms of obstacles to this seemingly natural 
and irrepressible historical force. Of these ‘obstacles’, culture features thematically in the 
literature and forms the basis of the prevailing attempts to conceptualise alternatives to liberal 
democracy. Ironically, such attempts resonate with the message of authoritarian leaders about 
‘Asian values’. This emphasises the ‘differentness’ of Asians and is employed to dismiss 
domestic political challenges as ‘un-Asian’ (Rodan 1995).   
A second theme to the literature is a not unrelated romanticisation of civil society which 
is depicted as the natural domain of personal and group freedoms, implicitly contrasted with the 
state as a set of naturally coercive power relationships. There is often an unstated assumption 
attached to this that the rise of civil society is fundamentally a middle-class phenomenon. Civil 
society is championed not just for its supposed intrinsic merit as the locus of free-minded and 
mutually-co-operative groups and individuals beyond the state’s purvey, but more particularly 
as an essential pre-condition for political parties to be genuinely competitive and meaningful 
conduits of the popular will. This tendency in the literature downplays the significance of gross 
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inequalities of power and resources that are to be found within civil society. It is the nature of 
civil society as much as the fact of it that matters to the prospect and direction of political 
change. Certainly not all opposition to authoritarian regimes in East and Southeast Asia is 
imbued with liberal democratic values or aspirations. 
  Moreover, the analytical and normative insistence on a state-civil society separation 
diverts attention from the critically important point that civil societies cannot exist as 
alternatives to states - only in relation to them. Civil society presupposes the state. The state 
provides the legal framework underwriting the independent political space of civil society. But 
attempts to reinforce or challenge the inequalities of civil society also involve the state in 
different ways - whether to enhance, consolidate or diminish the power of particular social 
groups. The state-society divide is always a difficult one to clearly make, but different historical 
conditions have resulted in pervasive states in much of East and Southeast Asia which make 
these boundaries even more problematic than in Europe and North America. The prevailing 
assumption is that ‘strong states’, by definition, are associated with ‘weak societies’. This is 
informed by the notion that civil societies, independent of the state, are the legitimate 
expression of society. But societal forces are to differing extents incorporated into the state and, 
especially in the East and Southeast Asian context, cannot be dismissed as political entities. 
Rather, here co-option is a real alternative to representation and civil society which may in 
many cases prove the most significant political accommodation to social diversity. 
Neither of these two dominant theoretical themes to the literature encourage a detailed 
examination of the nature of political change occurring in industrialising East and Southeast 
Asia.  The contest between authoritarianism and liberal democracy is part of the political 
struggle unfolding in the region, but it is certainly not the entirety of it. Some of these struggles 
do involve attempts to expand the space of civil society, though not always from ‘democratic’ 
forces. They can include religious organisations, professional bodies, trade unions, or any of a 
host of non-government organisations. But they can also involve attempts to establish space for 
political contestation in arenas other than civil society. Organised contests over particular 
exercises of official power can come from within state-sponsored organisations, even if this 
form of opposition is not oriented towards a change of government. Co-opting social forces is 
not unproblematic, even in one-party states, since this often targets groups precisely for fear of 
their potential as political opponents.  
Moreover, there is a conceptual limbo in the prevailing literature between civil society 
and state which conceals a wide variety of organised groups of differing political significance. 
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The danger is that new forms of political organisation and reconstitutions of state-society 
relations which do not correspond with the liberal democratic model will escape adequate 
identification and analysis.  
The emphasis on extra-parliamentary political activities suggests several types of 
‘opposition’. At one extreme, there is political opposition intended to fundamentally change the 
state and society, such as Communist or Islamic fundamentalist parties or movements. Another 
type of opposition seeks to change the government but not the state or society in any 
fundamental sense. Here we would include most oppositions identified by liberal pluralist 
theorists. Typically, this includes the attempt to replace one political party in government with 
another. Finally, there are oppositions which pursue an agenda of reform or reaction within the 
state and the existing government. This can be conducted by factions within the bureaucracy, 
the military, or various social and cultural organisations brought under the umbrella of a 
corporatist state. It can also be conducted by various non-government organisations outside the 
state but not part of the formal political protest.  This includes non-revolutionary trade unions, 
social and cultural organisations, for example, which pursue policy agendas without seeking to 
advance the cause of a particular political party or alternate government.  The importance of the 
respective types of opposition is related to both the capacity of the state to foreclose or foster 
particular avenues for opposition, and the degree to which contending groups accept the state or 
government as legitimate. 
For historical reasons, the state-society relationship in East and Southeast Asia contrasts 
in certain respects from the European experience and this has important implications for 
political opposition. In much of East and Southeast Asia, the state serves as the midwife of 
industrial capitalism which involves a different relationship between it and the bourgeoisie and 
civil society than in situations where an absolutist or feudal state attempts to obstruct 
capitalism. Since the state in East and Southeast Asia has embraced capitalism, structures 
emerge that incorporate the new social forces. Hence, political activities involving these social 
forces are often channelled into state sanctioned institutions. The environment for potential 
oppositions is quite different. 
 The principal question under scrutiny here is not whether ‘democratisation’ is occurring 
or likely to occur as economic change and social transformations take place in these societies. 
Instead, the question is what do these transformations mean for the nature of political 
opposition. The research objective is to specify the way in which challenges — real or in 
prospect — to or within authoritarian rule have resulted from the massive social changes 
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accompanying industrialisation. Of particular interest are the direct and indirect roles of 
emerging social forces — ‘New Rich’ comprising the bourgeoisie together with the middle 
class, and the working class - in the process of political opposition.  
There is extensive literature focusing specifically on the question of the middle class and 
its significance for political development. Much of this has been inspired by the unproductive 
hypothesis that the middle class is intrinsically hostile to authoritarian rule. However, 
historically the middle class has adopted a range of political positions, sometimes siding with 
fascist and authoritarian regimes - as in Italy and Chile. A new economic system that gives rise 
to new sources of wealth and class interest also produces new fracture lines in social and 
political interest and new policy issues. For example, the new middle class has organised 
around such issues as the quality of public utilities and services, the environment, public 
accountability and transparency. Their interests translate into new demands and constituencies 
that necessarily shape oppositional politics. But the notion that these interests are necessarily 
tied up with a push for political liberalism is certainly open to question as the political impact of 
new classes is contingent upon their relative location in the structures of social and economic 
power. For example, where its interests are threatened by powerful radical working class 
movements, or where it fears social chaos, the middle class is prepared to support authoritarian 
regimes. Similarly, working class political movements, the product of industrial capitalism, may 
take several forms, depending on the prevailing configurations of social power and political 
structure. They may be revolutionary oppositions, loyal oppositions, or elements of a large 
corporatist enterprise. 
The content, site and modus operandi of political opposition can therefore vary 
considerably, and these differences warrant careful attention. For some oppositionists, the 
agenda is of greater public accountability and transparency in government who seek to 
eradicate official corruption and other obstacles to a modern, efficient capitalist economy. But 
the reform agendas of such oppositionists from the business and middle classes  do not 
necessarily extend to more general demands for human rights or other political reforms that 
would open the state up to broader social forces. Rather, assorted human rights, social justice 
and welfare claims are often advanced by other oppositionists. Similarly, political parties are in 
some cases the principal, even if limited, articulator of political opposition — such as in 
Singapore — but to differing extents elsewhere in East and Southeast Asia we find social 
movements, NGOs, interest groups such as professional organisations, as well as individual 
dissidents employing various extra-parliamentary organisational and strategic means to oppose 
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government policy. In some cases, parliamentary and extra-parliamentary forms appear to be 
developing simultaneously — even if they remain essentially disconnected avenues. In other 
cases, the extra-parliamentary forms are the only ones to have significantly evolved in recent 
times. Finally, public demonstrations and labour strikes, whilst conspicuously absent in 
Singapore, are not uncommon in South Korea, for instance, and are increasingly common in 
Indonesia. Yet less visible challenges to government policy are common — especially where 
corporatist structures are either firmly established or even in the process of being extended.  
The position taken in this paper is that political opposition, whatever its form, involves 
the existence of political space to contest the exercise of power through government or regime. 
This space may be established within representative political institutions, but it is no less likely 
to exist outside them, and even within authoritarian regimes. Equally, it may involve the 
existence of civil society, but not necessarily. Accordingly, whilst political parties are obviously 
of interest, other forms of political contestation - regardless of whether or not these forms 
facilitate competitive party systems are of no less interest.  
In the discussion below, which selectively examines the theoretical literature relevant to 
the question of social transformations in industrialising Asia and their significance for political 
opposition, the following substantive points will be underlined: (i) dramatic transformations in 
social structures accompanying industrialisation are generally resulting in changes in state-
society relations, but this takes a variety of forms within East and Southeast Asia; (ii) this is a 
process best understood as the opening up of political space rather than the struggle between 
state and civil society; (iii) economic change throws up a variety of challenges, not just those 
produced by new forms of wealth and social power attempting to shape politics, but by those 
marginalised by the new forms of development who want to resist or reverse these changes and 
return to idealised traditional situations. 
Let us begin by examining the prevailing attempts in the literature to conceptualise 
political opposition and the particular challenges posed by authoritarian systems in this 
exercise. 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AS THE POINT OF REFERENCE 
In the classic academic works on political opposition undertaken by Dahl (1966a; 1971; 1973), 
the greater focus is on industrialised, liberal democratic societies and the place of legally-
protected political parties therein. However, at the outset of the first of these works, Dahl 
(1966b: xi) observes that the right to such an opposition is a particularly modern phenomenon, 
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especially in the context of electoral systems based on universal franchise. To be sure, Dahl was 
in no doubt about the importance of the context within which parties operate. As he stated: ‘A 
country with universal suffrage and a completely repressive government would provide fewer 
opportunities for oppositions, surely, than a country with a narrow suffrage but a highly tolerant 
government’ (Dahl 1971: 5). Furthermore, he recognised that: ‘To the extent that an opposition 
concentrate on elections and parliamentary action, it may be powerful in unimportant 
encounters and feeble or even absent when key decisions are made’ (Dahl 1966b: 395). 
Nevertheless, the questions he was fundamentally concerned with related to the factors that 
facilitate or obstruct this form of opposition, and the variety in the character of political 
oppositions taking this particular form.     
In Dahl’s schema, the two extremes of political regimes are polyarchic and hegemonic 
systems. The former he describes as ‘highly inclusive and open to public contestation’(Dahl 
1971: 8), which manifests in the greatest number and variety of interests represented in policy 
making (Dahl 1973: 9). By contrast, the latter prohibits any form of organised dissent or 
opposition in a highly exclusive decision-making regime. No distinction is drawn between loyal 
and disloyal opposition. Rather, by definition opposition is regarded as disloyal and must be 
repressed (Dahl 1973: 13).
2 One of Dahl’s central observations is that the tolerance by 
authorities of opposition is linked to calculations by governments about the political costs of 
otherwise attempting to coerce or obstruct opponents (Dahl 1966b: xii; 1971: 15). 
The tolerance or lack of tolerance towards a ‘loyal’ opposition is obviously a basic 
yardstick within this framework. The concept has its roots in eighteenth century Britain, used to 
describe the party out of power as ‘His (Her) Majesty’s Loyal Opposition’. Such an opposition 
was understood to be loyal to the Crown, even if it was office-seeking (see Safire 1972). Most 
importantly, loyal opposition attempts to gain office through constitutional rather than 
revolutionary means. In a broad sense, this commitment materially affects the content of 
opposition in so far as this involves a loyalty to the institutions of the state and the associated 
rules and regulations for their alteration; and hence a readiness ‘at any moment to come into 
office without a shock to the political traditions of the nation’ (Lowell as quoted in Punnett 
1973: 13).  
Yet within these limits, loyal oppositions obviously can vary in their objectives and 
strategies. Dahl’s distinction between structural and non-structural oppositions remains an 
influential one in attempting to specify this. Structural oppositions attempt to fundamentally 
alter the distribution of economic and social power through constitutional means. This may 
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require some modification to the constitution, but to remain loyal such structural opposition 
must do this according to the rules of the constitution itself. The difficulties this can pose have 
been a source of frustration and division amongst reformers in socialist and social democratic 
parties in particular. As Punnett (1973: 14) points out, however, it is not just the advocates of 
structural change who can be tempted to reject constitutional processes. In seeking to 
consolidate the basic social and economic order, the constitution can be a target of extreme 
right-wing groups who see liberal democracy as a threat to that order.  
Whilst there are important distinctions to be made between the different characters of 
political parties seeking to replace the government and the margins of tolerance for their 
challenge, opposition to government policies in liberal democratic systems comes from various 
sources and takes numerous forms, including interest groups and social movements. This has 
long been recognised in liberal political theory and systems theory, in which political parties are 
understood to either straddle civil society and formal institutions or act as conduits for societal 
demands conveyed through civil society (see Bobbio 1989: 25). Even so, much of the interest in 
opposition of this sort has been in its role complementing or supporting competitive party 
systems rather than as opposition in its own right.  
However, not all the literature so acutely privileges party politics. Definitions of 
democracy which extend themselves beyond mere formalism or electoralism acknowledge the 
importance of extra-parliamentary activities somewhat differently. Schmitter and Karl (1991: 
78), for example, contend that: ‘Modern democracy, in other words, offers a variety of 
competitive processes and channels for the expression of interests and values - associational as 
well as partisan, functional as well as territorial, collective as well as individual. All are integral 
to its practice’. Much earlier, Bertrand de Jouvenel (1966: 157) argued that ‘The means of 
opposition are the infrastructure of political liberty: the party of opposition is simply an element 
of superstructure’. He emphasised the difference between seeking to be involved in 
government, at any level, and seeking political representation and warned that the biggest threat 
to representation was its absorption into the system of government through co-option (de 
Jouvenal 1966: 168). At the time, he had trade unions in mind as a clear example of the 
prescribed duality. Both these approaches come closer to acknowledging the plurality of 
oppositional forms in liberal democracies alongside, rather than in the service of, electoral 
politics. But, they are also premised on the existence of liberal democracy. 
Barker (1971: 4–6) emphasises that, in addition to the concept of ‘loyal opposition’ with 
which many liberal theorists were preoccupied, ‘opposition’ can also be understood as: outright 
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resistance to the state; resistance to the power of the state when that power is exerted 
oppressively; resistance to the group, faction or dynasty controlling the state; a system of 
constitutional checks and balances guarding against power abuse; and methods employed by 
citizens or groups to modify the actions of government without openly challenging that 
government. Like Dahl, Barker (1971) emphasises how contemporary a phenomenon, and 
indeed an idea, institutionalised loyal opposition is. As he argues, such an opposition is by no 
means synonymous with liberalism, at least not in its earlier variants expressed through such 
people as John Stuart Mill. Certainly Mill believed government benefited from the debate of 
diverse opinion in parliament, but guided by reasoned, disinterested argument. Rather than the 
formalisation of dissent through a loyal opposition and party politics, Mill placed emphasis on 
the critical role of a free press in scrutinising government (Barker 1971: 13–15). According to 
Barker (1971: 17), ‘It was not the existence of an organised Opposition that liberals valued, but 
the freedom to oppose and criticise, a freedom which could not be properly exercised in formal 
organised parties’.  
Barker (1971: 25–6) criticised Dahl for his overly-prescriptive attachment to liberal 
democracy which he believed lead to insufficient differentiation of the forms and contents of 
oppositions in favour of a celebration of the existence of opposition per se.
3  A similar criticism 
was made of Ionescu and de Madariaga (1968) and at least the initial editions of the journal 
Government and Opposition  under de Madariaga’s editorship. These authors contended that: 
‘the presence or absence of institutionalised political opposition can become the criterion for the 
classification of any political society in one of two categories: liberal or dictatorial, democratic 
or authoritarian, pluralistic-constitutional or monolithic’ (as quoted in Barker 1971: 26). 
 Subsequent to Barker’s criticisms, an edited collection by Dahl included the work of 
Juan Linz and others attempting to address some of these concerns. In contrast with liberal 
democracies in which the major distinction to make was between loyal and disloyal opposition, 
Linz (1973) emphasised that in authoritarian regimes the major distinction was between 
opponents inside and outside the system; and that this was not simply a distinction between 
legal and illegal opposition. The concept of ‘semi-opposition’ was advanced by Linz in drawing 
this out. According to Linz (1973: 191), semi-opposition ‘consists of those groups that are not 
dominant or represented in the governing group but that are willing to participate in power 
without fundamentally challenging the regime’. Such opposition is not institutionalised, as in 
the case of political parties, and may take seemingly apolitical forms - a religious association or 
an educational institution, for example. These social groups do not enjoy legal protection for 
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their political activities and thus have a precarious existence.
4 However, the chief difference 
between semi-oppositions in authoritarian regimes and oppositions in a liberal democracy, 
according to Linz (1973: 193), lies in the absence of any accountability  to some form of 
‘constituency’. Semi-opposition thus signifies a selective opening up of the inner circle, rather 
than a legitimising of interest group politics.
5     
This concept has its problems, especially in deciphering at what point groups or 
individuals could be said to be ‘participating in power’ (Aspinall 1995: 3), or in specifying the 
qualitative difference between the limits on semi-oppositions on the one hand, and loyal 
oppositions on the other, in fostering genuinely alternative programmes.  Nevertheless, Linz 
directs attention to the fact of limited political pluralism, and he puts the question of political 
co-option into a different context. Attempts by groups and individuals to exploit contradictions 
within the state for pragmatic ends are rendered more visible. Recently, Stepan (1993: 64) 
identified five key opposition functions of democratic opposition in authoritarian regimes: 
resisting integration into the regime; guarding zones of autonomy against it; disputing its 
legitimacy; raising the costs of authoritarian rule; creating a credible democratic alternative. 
Whilst opposition in East and Southeast Asia may quite often fall short on such criteria, it 
nevertheless may be the ascendant form in most societies and the one with best prospects of 
extension. Co-option is a thematic question confronting analysts of political change in East and 
Southeast Asia. 
Although Linz and others attempted some time ago to steer attention to the particularities 
of political oppositions other than formal, constitutional, loyal oppositions, much of the recent 
interest in the prospects of political change in industrialising East and Southeast Asia remains 
indifferent to the conceptual challenge Linz took up. In Lawson’s recent work on political 
opposition in Asia, for example, she contends that: ‘where there is no possibility of alternation 
in power between governing elements and oppositional elements through a peaceful process of 
fair and open elections, there is no constitutional opposition, and therefore no genuine 
democracy’ (Lawson 1993a: 194; see also Lawson 1993b). Certainly there can be no liberal 
democracy without constitutional opposition, but this does not necessarily mean opposition 
itself is entirely absent. This privileging of a particular oppositional form is understandable if 
we are only interested in whether liberal democracy exists, but it is not helpful if we are trying 
to identify the extent and nature of political oppositions per se. More than a decade earlier, 
Justus van der Kroef (1978a: 621) observed that ‘the more effective and, from an international 
point of view, the more visible form of political opposition has tended to be organised and 
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expressed outside parliament and the electoral system’. He referred to students and segments of 
the intellectual community, the military, religious and ethnic groups, and communist 
organisations (van der Kroef 1978a: 622). There have certainly been changes in the character, 
contexts and relative importance of such opposition since then, but these changes escape 
attention in frameworks that search only for loyal oppositions operating through parliamentary 
processes.  
However, with regard to the political systems in East and Southeast Asian societies, there 
have been recent attempts to characterise them which break from such heavy reliance upon the 
dominant liberal framework. The problem is that these attempts are heavily reliant upon 
culturalist perspectives that conceal rather than reveal the complex dynamics in these societies.  
CONCEPTUALISING ALTERNATIVES IN ASIA 
Amongst conservative and liberal writers, cultural factors have long been an important 
component of political analysis (Almond and Verba 1965). Of late, though, there has been a 
noticeable revival of interest in political culture, at various levels of abstraction, as much of the 
literature addresses the question of what factors are needed to sustain ‘democratisation’ in those 
countries to have recently broken from authoritarian rule (see Huntington 1991; Dahl 1994).
6 
Not all theorists share the conviction that culture is so important to the establishment of liberal 
democracy. Schmitter and Karl (1991: 82) argue ‘that contingent consent and bounded 
uncertainty can emerge from the interaction between antagonistic and mutually suspicious 
actors and that the far more benevolent and ingrained norms of a civic culture are better thought 
of as a product and not a producer of democracy’.
7  
Nevertheless, the concept of culture has been widely employed in a fundamental way to 
generalise the patterns of political development. In Pye’s (1985) influential thesis on Asian 
political culture, for instance, he clearly recognised that the liberal path of North America and 
Europe may not be feasible in late industrialising countries of Asia. However, he did not see 
this so much as the consequence of different historical and socio-political factors generating 
power relations hostile to, or unreliant on, liberalism. Rather, he emphasised the durability of 
anti-liberal Asian political culture. Subsequently, Moody (1988) sought to demonstrate how 
personalism and moralism, points Pye attributed to Chinese culture, posed obstacles to liberal 
democracy in East Asia. Moody (1988: 12) observed: ‘In East Asia there is an intellectual 
heritage critical of unrestrained power  but no heritage of institutional limitations on power. 
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Both the social ethos and the institutional heritage contributed to politics organised around 
personal groups and defined in moral terms’.   
 More recently,  a number of authors have adopted the concept of culture ostensibly as a 
way around the problem of measuring political development solely against the yardstick of 
liberal democracy. Fukuyama (1992b: 109) himself now contends ‘there are grounds for 
thinking that Asian political development could turn away from democracy and take its own 
unique path in spite of the region’s record of economic growth’. According to him, this possible 
‘Asian alternative’ is linked to pervasive group hierarchies emanating from traditional social 
structures in culturally-Confucian societies. Whilst the end of history may have meant 
ideological and institutional convergence around the globe, cultural diversity not only remains 
but, according to Fukuyama, underlies divergences in economic success and social cohesion 
(see Fukuyama 1995a, 1995b). Similarly, Huntington (1993a: 17) contends that: ‘The 
interaction of economic progress and Asian culture appears to have generated a distinctly East 
Asian variety of democratic institutions’. The dominant-party systems prevalent in the region, 
he points out, have the formal trappings of liberal democracy, but political participation is 
effectively reserved for one party: ‘This type of political system offers democracy without 
turnover. It represents an adaptation of Western democratic practices to serve not Western 
values of competition and change, but Asian values of consensus and stability’ (Huntington 
1993a: 18).
8
But whilst Fukuyama and Huntington acknowledge the hostility of deep-seated traditional 
Asian cultures to liberalism, in contrast to Pye they maintain that Asian cultures also contain 
some ‘democratic’ elements. This is an important departure from Pye’s (1985) generalisation 
which tends to obscure divisions within and between the various Asian societies. Fukuyama 
(1995a), for instance, maintains that there are at least three respects in which Confucianism is 
compatible with ‘democracy’: the traditional Confucian examination system was meritocratic 
and thus egalitarian in its implications; the importance attached to education; and the tolerant 
nature of Confucianism, given that it has co-existed with Buddhism and Christianity.
9 Similarly, 
based on the premise that cultures are dynamic rather than immutable and static, Huntington 
also holds out the prospect that, over time, democratic cultural elements could prevail in Asia. 
According to Huntington (1993a: 21): ‘Confucian democracy may be a contradiction in terms, 
but democracy in a Confucian society need not be’. Huntington does not actually specify the 
‘democratic elements’ he has in mind, but it is implicit that they are compatible with liberal 
democracy since no other possibility is raised. This assumption is also apparent in the criteria 
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Fukuyama cites as indicative of democratic cultural heritages. But what is most noteworthy 
about the propositions by both Huntington and Fukuyama is the idea that culture either lies at 
the core of political differences between ‘Asia’ and the liberal ‘West’, and is therefore central to 
the prospects of bridging this gap, or fundamentally shapes any possible democratic political 
trajectory in East Asia. The effect of this is to divert attention from the question of  alternatives 
to liberal democracy in Asia in favour of the idea of ‘Asian’ alternatives. 
  This analytical importance attached to culture allows observations about the 
‘differentness of Asians’ to be appropriated for political and ideological purposes, and even 
legitimates such exercises. Huntington’s (1993b) not unrelated thesis about a ‘clash of 
civilizations’ supplanting the previous ideological disputes characterising the Cold War has 
added impetus to broad, monolithic conceptions of ‘Asian culture’.
10 Select authoritarian 
leaders in Asia have vigorously promoted the idea of ‘Asian values’ to deflect pressure over 
human rights and employment conditions and launch an offensive against liberalism. Whilst 
this may be designed to insulate authoritarian regimes from external criticism, it also attempts 
to depict domestic political opponents and dissenters, who do not share these values, as ‘un-
Asian’ and dismissible on that basis. Significantly, this rhetoric about cultural homogeneity 
surfaces precisely at a point when social and economic transformations in various Asian 
societies produce diverse interests and identities requiring some sort of political 
accommodation. Obviously authoritarian leaders prefer an accommodation that least threatens 
their positions. The recurring theme by self-appointed spokespersons on ‘Asian values’ about a 
cultural predisposition to consensus rather than contention is an especially useful rationale for 
this. 
  Whilst the ‘Asian values’ perspective is principally enunciated by a handful of 
authoritarian elites in Asia, this has not diminished its impact on policy makers and analysts 
outside the region. Many appear to take these arguments at face value in their attempts to 
comprehend these societies. The appeal of cultural relativism ranges across the political 
spectrum, providing both a basis for condemnation of ‘Western imperialism’ as well as 
rationalising inaction over behaviour that elsewhere would be protested as human rights abuses 
(Robison 1993). Some cynically adopt the rhetoric about ‘Asian values’ to advance neo-liberal 
and conservative political agendas within established liberal democracies outside the region 
(Rodan 1995). As would be expected, a critical public reaction within the region to the 
proclamations of Lee Kuan Yew et al. on ‘Asian values’ has given some expression to the 
fallacy of harmony and consensus amongst ‘Asians’, including from the recently-established 
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Forum of Democratic Leaders in the Asia-Pacific (Sydney Morning Herald 27 June 1995: 8). 
Most of these voices are, however, from relatively high-profile figures who might also be 
categorised as the elite: political leaders, prominent lawyers and academics. Other divergent 
perspectives from within the non-government and grassroots communities of course have less 
access to the media to challenge the ‘Asian values’ line, and pursue agendas such as welfare, 
human rights and social justice issues as well as, in the case of some developmental NGOs, the 
establishment of greater participatory democracy and a shift in social power. 
The pre-occupation with liberal democratic political forms thus combines with cultural 
arguments about a supposed ‘Asian’ aversion to political contestation in favour of consensus 
and group harmony to limit inquiry into political oppositions. The additional tendency in the 
literature to emphasise the strategic importance of political leadership in effecting and 
sustaining ‘democratic’ transitions serves to further devalue the analytical currency of political 
opposition in East and Southeast Asia. Most of this attention has centred on ruling elites and 
their tolerance or otherwise of political contestation (see Higley and Burton 1989; Case 1994; 
Marks 1992; Huntington 1991; Diamond and Plattner 1993; Scalapino 1993). The pivotal role 
of elites is described by Case (1994: 438) thus: ‘In sum, class structures, civil society, and 
social structures may cut in a variety of ways. To see which way, one must investigate elites, in 
particular the attitudes they hold and the relations they forge with societal audiences’. The 
choice of the term ‘audience’ rather than ‘forces’, for example, seems to infer a passivity that 
emphasises an unambiguous causal relationship from the elite down. It also assumes that elites 
are free to make a range of choices. Huntington (1991: 108) similarly attributes exceptional 
strategic significance to elite leadership in contending that: ‘If he had wanted to, a political 
leader far less skilled than Lee Kuan Yew could have produced democracy in Singapore’.  
Having argued a case for broadening the framework beyond liberal pluralism, and having 
found culturalist arguments unsatisfactory to this task, let us examine other theoretical material 
that might be more helpful. 
BEYOND POLITICAL PARTIES: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
It must be acknowledged that the preoccupation with political parties and the formal political 
system at the expense of other broader processes of contestation is most acute amongst liberal 
theorists writing on ‘democratisation’ in Asia. The extensive literature from this framework on 
the functioning of democracy in Western Europe and the United States, by contrast, has paid 
greater attention to the links between political parties and their many and varied social bases 
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and the institutions through which these bases are mediated. Parties are of course not distinct 
from society. They respond to interests and pressures emanating from constituencies within 
society, constituencies with differential capacities and means to exert an influence over parties. 
However, whilst some groups attempt to exert this consciously and explicitly, others are less 
directly or explicitly connected to the formal political process. It is this latter category to which 
far greater attention has now turned, as cynicism towards, and alienation with, the formal 
political process in established liberal democracies appears to have gathered momentum in 
recent decades and manifested in a variety of new organisational structures. Accompanying this 
is the emergence of a body of literature focussing on ‘new social movements’ (NSMs). The 
assumption in this literature is that NSMs are new phenomena affecting the form, locus and 
nature of political opposition. Whilst this claim may be overstated, and ultimately effectiveness 
depends upon their impact on formal political processes, this literature is nevertheless helping 
to broaden our conception of politics and political opposition. Let us, then, briefly survey and 
evaluate some of its main features.  
Social movements, either as an  analytical category or as social phenomena, are not new. 
As Shaw (1994: 651) reminds us, the study of social movements was ‘the stock in trade of 
social historians of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’. Indeed, in the 
broad historical sense, social movements are a fundamentally modern rather than post-modern 
phenomenon, dating from the peasant revolts and the workers’ movements studied by these 
scholars, to the late twentieth century variety (Shaw 1994: 651). Scott defines a social 
movement as: 
a collective actor constituted by individuals who understand themselves to have common 
interests and, at least for some significant part of their social existence, a common identity. Such 
movements are distinguished from other collective actors, such as political parties and pressure 
groups, in that they have mass mobilisation, or the threat of mobilisation, as their prime source 
of social sanction, and hence of power. They are further distinguished by other collectivities, 
such as voluntary associations or clubs, in being chiefly concerned to defend or change society 
(Scott 1990: 6).  
This definition concedes the possibility of considerable diversity in the sorts of political 
objectives, organisational structures, ideological commitments, social bases, and extent of 
movements. What then are the distinctive characteristics of ‘new’ social movements?  
A number of generalisations and themes can be discerned from the extensive and 
theoretically-diverse literature. NSMs are commonly depicted as: international in character; 
subscribing to values that fundamentally challenge the existing social and economic order; 
consciously operating outside the established political structures linked to the state, especially 
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political parties; employing mass mobilisation, or the threat thereof, as the principal political 
weapon; having decentralised, informal and often transient organisational structures; and 
lacking an easily-identifiable social base, being instead issue- and value-based movements of 
disparate and fluid composition (see Crook, Pakulski and Waters 1993; Scott 1990).  
These generalisations portray an ideal type category, since each of these characteristics 
can only more or less apply to the respective heterogenous organisations under this banner. 
Included here are environmentalist, feminist, peace, anti-racist and other movements. There is a 
strong emphasis on NSMs as extra-parliamentary forms of opposition and protest based on 
values and attitudes, as distinct from the more traditional disputes over the distribution of 
resources.
11 State structures in general are viewed by NSM members to be easily corrupted to 
instrumental rather than value-based decisions. This critique supposedly informs the loose, anti-
bureaucratic organisational forms attributed to NSMs.
12 Some of these NSMs are understood as 
potentially liberating, such as feminist movements, but many more are viewed by Habermas 
(1987: 392–3) as defensive, attempting to stem the incursions of the ‘economic-administrative 
complex’ on the ‘lifeworld’.
13 Generally, though, they are portrayed in positive terms, a 
tendency which downplays movements like the Aum Supreme Truth in Japan, and the 
Michigan Militia and Branch Davidians in the USA.  
 In a sense, any mobilisation of social forces is a political act that will inevitably involve 
some engagement with the state. The most conspicuous cases involve formal political 
engagement by NSMs and the establishment of ‘alternative’ political parties, such as the 
German Greens and other ecology-oriented movement parties (see Kaelberer 1993). But it can 
take more subtle forms, such as the incorporation of feminist and anti-racist perspectives into 
school syllabuses via state representative and consultative committees and advisory boards. The 
dilemma these movements face is that, however distasteful the established structures may be to 
them, these have to be influenced to affect any change on the specific issues of concern. The 
price of success in forcing policy makers to take notice of them is an increased risk of co-
option. Not all forms of co-option result in the same sorts of compromises to autonomy and 
principle, but they almost certainly generate internal disputations amongst movement members. 
 But the broader and more important theoretical point is that social movements are not 
completely separate social phenomena requiring a distinct analytical framework. Rather, they 
exist in relation to other elements of civil society and traditional institutions. To understand 
their impact as political oppositions these relational dimensions are crucial (Shaw 1994). But 
neither the fact of co-option nor the importance of the institutions alongside social movements 
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negate the significance of NSMs for political opposition.
14 In particular, the extra-parliamentary 
nature of these movements politicises social and cultural spheres and potentially exposes the 
exercise of power to broader contestation. Moreover, whilst the concerns expressed, such as 
environmentalism, cannot easily be separated from the material development of global 
capitalism and the class structures underlying it (Wilde 1990), these movements represent a 
challenge to the strategies of leftist activists which must take them as a given, not a diversion. 
 Alvarez and Escobar (1992) maintain that during the 1970s and 1980s various forms of 
social movements emerged in Latin America to assert an important influence over political life. 
These movements have, they argue, ‘placed previously suppressed or marginalised demands on 
to the political agenda - claiming rights to better urban services and land, as well as to increased 
population and more meaningful democratic participation’ (Alvarez and Escobar 1992: 326). 
Hellman (1992) sees this forcing some reassessment by political parties in an endeavour to 
capitalise on the mobilisational capacities of these movements. But within East and Southeast 
Asia where industrialisation has in some parts matured considerably, and where working-class-
based organisations like trade unions are still subjected to the repressive apparatus of the state, 
there is increasing evidence of non-government organisational activity. 
Significant variations in the range and strength of social movements in the respective East 
and Southeast Asian societies, and the relationships between social movements and political 
parties, represent a major force behind the differential political trajectories unfolding in the 
region. These different trajectories, of course, will further expose the fallacy of the ‘Asian 
values’ emphasis on cultural commonality supposedly steering polities in the same general 
direction. 
So the theoretical opening-up of work on political oppositions in liberal democracies has 
the potential to feed into more imaginative approaches to the study of oppositions under 
authoritarian rule. For the fruits of this to be fully realised, though, it is necessary to dispense 
with the influential notion that extra-parliamentary political contestation is best understood in 
terms of the conflicting objectives of state and civil society.   
BEYOND THE ‘STATE VERSUS CIVIL SOCIETY’ DICHOTOMY 
The concept of civil society has a long history, throughout which it has assumed a variety 
of meanings (see Shils 1991; Keane 1988; Bobbio 1989; Kumar 1993; Bryant 1993; Reitzes 
1994; Tester 1992; Gellner 1994). This reflects in the diverse usages of the concept’s current 
revival. As Kumar (1993: 383) observes: ‘So, today, civil society has been found in the 
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economy and the polity; in the area between the family and the state, or the individual and the 
state; in the non-state institutions which organise and educate citizens for political participation; 
even as an expression of the whole civilising mission of modern society’. Despite these 
problems, the concept can be usefully employed; this is certainly not a call for the concept’s 
shelving. To be sure, civil society is the form of political space that affords the most substantive 
oppositional capacity and potential, within which social forces can both resist and co-operate 
with the state in their own interests. In qualitatively differentiating the different sorts of political 
space this concept is indispensable. Nevertheless, civil society is one form of political space 
within which oppositions can operate - not the only space. 
It is not the point here to survey the various traditions represented in the literature on civil 
society, but rather to focus primarily on the major intellectual influences shaping the concept's 
usage in analysing political change and opposition. In particular, the juxtaposition of civil 
society against state, with a clear normative preference for the former, is a powerful 
contemporary theme. This has a variety of analytical consequences, including inadequate 
specification of the content of oppositional positions within civil society and the concealment of 
political oppositions operating outside this realm.   
Among liberal theorists, definitions of civil society approvingly emphasise themes of 
independence, liberty, plurality and voluntary action. Diamond (1994: 5), for example, defines 
civil society as ‘the realm of organised social life that is voluntary, self-regulating, (largely) 
self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules’. 
He also contends that: ‘To the extent that an organisation...seeks to monopolise a functional or 
political space in society, claiming that it represents the only legitimate path, it contradicts the 
pluralistic market-oriented nature of civil society’ (Diamond 1994: 7). Similarly, Mirsky (1993: 
572) describes civil society as ‘a social sphere in which no single locus of authority 
predominates and in which men and women interact with each other in a series of overlapping 
relationships and associations - communal, civic, religious, economic, social, and cultural’. The 
understanding of civil society in residual terms vis-a-vis the state - the realm of social relations 
not encompassed by the state - often carries with it powerful normative assumptions about this 
separation. As Parekh (1993: 160) points out, for liberal theorists, quite unlike civil society, the 
state is a coercive and compulsory institution: ‘coercive because it enjoys the power of life and 
death over its members, compulsory because its citizens are its members by birth and may not 
leave it, and outsiders may not enter it, without its approval’. In this view, the role of 
government is to maximise the liberties of self-determining agents and to facilitate their goals, 
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not to impose grand goals separate from these. The normative attachment to civil society is at 
times quite explicit in the literature. Kukathas and Lovell (1991: 35–6), for instance, assert that : 
‘The ideological and political collapse of communism suggests that we should redirect our 
attention to the target of its attack: to reassert the functions of the traditions and institutions of 
civil society, and to ask what is necessary if its development or regeneration is to be made 
possible’ (Kukathas and Lovell 1991: 35–6). They add that ‘civil society is important because 
of its contributions to the constitution of human identity and the fulfilment of individual 
aspirations’. Others emphasise the ‘civility’ of this particular social realm, which is sometimes 
depicted as protecting liberal democracy from the inherent dangers of extremism (see Shils 
1991: 14).  
 The celebration of civil society and political pluralism associated with it is also a feature 
of the post-structuralist and post-modernist literature on new social movements. Here the 
juxtaposition of repressive state against liberal civil society is arrived at via a somewhat 
different route, but the effect is fundamentally the same. According to Cohen and Arato (1992: 
71), ‘Post-Marxists not only register, as did Gramsci, the durability of civil society under 
capitalist democracies and the consequent implausibility of revolution, but maintain the 
normative desirability of the preservation of civil society’. They further observe that: ‘All of our 
relevant sources view liberal democracy as a necessary condition for bringing the modern state 
under control’ (Cohen and Arato 1992: 80). Again, the premise is the notion that the state is 
inherently predisposed to oppression, whereas civil society is the natural domain of liberty. 
  The emphasis on civil society as the dichotomous opposite of the state, and the 
fashionable identification by scholars with the former, brings with it a number of problems: the 
idealisation of civil society; the fostering of a zero-sum conception of the relationship between 
state and civil society; the obscuring of attempts to gain state power to shape relationships in 
civil society; and the conceptual concealment of those ambiguous but significant relationships 
between state and society. 
 First, civil society is in fact the locus of a range of inequalities based on class, gender, 
ethnicity, race, and sexual preference, for example, that are symptomatic of specific economic, 
social and political systems of power (Wood 1990; Kumar 1994; Reitzes 1994). The ‘tendency 
to demonise the state and deify civil society’, as Reitzes (1994: 105) puts it, plays down this 
darker side, and ignores the fact that the internal structures and practices of autonomous 
organisations can be both undemocratic and uncivil — a point amply demonstrated in the 
organisations currently surfacing in Eastern Europe as well as those that emerged in South 
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Africa during the 1980s (see Reintges 1990; Shubane 1992; Howe 1991; Salecl 1992). 
Obviously the political implications of the various elements of civil society differ according to 
their respective objectives and practices.  
In rapidly-industrialising East and Southeast Asia, regime opponents include reactionary 
elements. Economic change throws up a variety of challenges, not just those by new sources of 
power and wealth seeking more open and accountable public decision making. Rather, 
marginalised groups resistant to certain forms of change, such as the recently-banned Muslim 
fundamentalist non-government organisation (NGO) Al Arqam in Malaysia, are motivated by 
concern about the erosion of traditional religious values. Moreover, a range of elitist and 
hierarchical structures and ideologies characterise the various organisations resurfacing and 
emerging in the region. Amongst new sources of power and wealth, the aspirations for political 
liberalisation can also be somewhat exclusive. 
Second, the notion that state and civil society are essentially locked in some sort of zero-
sum game is especially limiting. Stepan’s (1985: 318) specification of four logical possibilities 
in the unfolding of power relations between state and civil society is worth reiterating: state 
power can be extended in zero-sum fashion to the detriment of civil society; power in both 
realms can be simultaneously expanded in a positive-sum game; power can simultaneously 
decline in both realms, in a negative-sum fashion; and, finally, the power of civil society sectors 
can expand while those of the state decline. The arguments of various chapters in this volume 
underline this range in state-society possibilities as industrialisation and social transformations 
advance, including the expansion of the state itself rather than civil society, as in Singapore. 
Third, the connection between civil society and the state is stronger than the latter 
providing the legal framework for the former to exist. The process of political contestation - 
whether it be over the control of formal political institutions of the state or the attempt to 
influence these through interest groups or social movements - often centres around competing 
efforts to redress or consolidate relationships in civil society. This relationship has to some 
extent received attention from Held (1987, 1989, 1993) and Keane (Keane 1988), who have 
argued the case for the mutual ‘democratisation’ of state and civil society.   
Fourth, there is a real danger that too sharp a delineation of state and society — and the 
related delineation of state and civil society — conceals  important and interesting aspects of 
state-society relationships not easily handled within this dichotomous, zero-sum framework . In 
particular, the way in which societal forces have been incorporated or co-opted into some sort 
of relationship with state structures, though not always unproblematically for policy makers and 
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officials of the state, demands careful analysis. Gorz’s  (1980) observation that the state in 
advanced liberal democratic societies has increasingly usurped the social self-regulatory 
capacity of civil society at the expense of reciprocity and voluntarism partly recognises the 
limitations of the dominant conceptual dichotomy. Certainly it challenges the neat association 
of liberal democracy with an expansive civil society. Similarly, the extensive literature on 
corporatism in liberal democracies variously suggests that the social forces in civil society are 
being subverted or selectively bolstered, through functional representations. The significance of 
these political forms could withstand considerable elaboration, however.  
Schmitter (1992: 427) has possibly come closest to grasping the implications of state-
society relations with his emphasis on the varied and discrete arenas and processes of political 
contestation associated with the modern state: 
First, what if a modern democracy were conceptualised, not as ‘a regime’, but as a composite of 
‘partial regimes’, each of which was institutionalised around distinctive sites for the 
representation of social groups and the resolution of their ensuing conflicts? Parties, 
associations, movements, localities and various clientele would compete and coalesce through 
these different channels in efforts to capture office and influence policy. Authorities with 
different functions and at different levels of aggregation would interact with these 
representatives and could legitimately claim accountability to different citizen interests (and 
passions). 
His concept of ‘partial regimes’ is explicitly intended to transcend the limitations of the 
traditional liberal notion that political parties are the most important and influential expression 
of political representation vis-a-vis the state. Thus he steers attention to the organisational 
representations of class, sectoral and professional interests which ‘might intrude on the putative 
monopoly of political parties in the representation of social groups’ (Schmitter 1992: 431). 
Most importantly, his notion that liberal democracies comprise assorted forms of political 
representation encompassing a range of institutional sites encourages a more comprehensive 
and detailed analysis of the political intersection of state and society. This includes 
development of the analysis of organisational links to the formal political process as some 
writers have attempted, for example, by applying the concept of partial regimes to regulatory 
structures.  
Whilst Schmitter’s idea of ‘partial regimes’ is intended to assist in defining ‘democracy’ 
by subjecting more institutional sites to scrutiny,
15 the attempt to broaden the focus of political 
analysis has wider implications. A fifth point, then, is that the boundaries between state and 
civil society are greatly complicated by the existence of a host of institutional forums that 
attempt to incorporate social forces - regardless of whether these forms of representation are 
democratic.  But if these boundaries are at times obscure in established liberal democracies, 
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they are no less problematic elsewhere where different historical contexts have resulted in a 
pronounced ideological assertiveness for pervasive state structures.
16 The predominant 
acknowledgment of this feature of so many post-colonial societies is to contrast extensive states 
with under-developed social organisations: strong state, weak society (see Blaney and Pasha 
1993). It is often the ability of regimes, especially but not only authoritarian regimes, to 
incorporate organised social forces that renders them so effective in political terms. But this 
effectiveness does not simply derive from the negation of an organisation’s independence from 
the state or the obstruction of other organisations in society, important as both are. Rather, it lies 
also in the very fact of social organisation. The point is that societal groups may be highly 
organised, even if not residing in civil society. Rigger’s chapter on Taiwan gives this special 
attention. 
Moreover, a sharp state-society dichotomy is not sufficiently sensitive to changes within 
polities where a pervassive state has incorporated societal forces. Ding (1994: 298) appears to 
be addressing this problem in his adoption of the concept of ‘institutional amphibiousness’. It 
has the following features: 
First, the boundaries between institutional structures are ambiguous. Institutional structures are 
so closely interwoven with each other in their actual operation that the formal demarcation of the 
scope of each other’s activities or powers becomes insignificant. Secondly, the nature of 
individual institutions is indeterminate. An institution can be used for purposes contrary to those 
it is supposed to fulfil, and the same institution can simultaneously serve conflicting purposes. 
This, he contends, not a civil society offensive, was the most crucial dynamic in the dramatic 
political changes in Eastern Europe and important in the build up of dissident and oppositional 
forces in China leading to the 1989 Democracy Movement. For Ding, societal forces 
incorporated into the one-party state via ‘pseudo-social organisations’ can, in certain 
circumstances, ‘convert these organisations from state agencies into instruments for the 
expression of ideals, or mobilisation and co-ordination of interests against the party-state’ (Ding 
1994: 298–9). The attraction of Ding’s concept lies in its recognition of the possibility of 
contradictions and tensions internal to the corporatist state, as well as its recognition that the 
absence of a civil society does not automatically equate with a lack of social organisation. It is 
particularly instructive for analyses of one-party states where political oppositions may be more 
likely to manifest themselves outside the formal political institutions.
17  
Some authors have attempted to take this point further, in effect questioning whether 
there is another realm that has so far escaped adequate conceptualisation: a realm which 
constitutes the intersection of state and society. Habermas (1989) took this up, in a fashion, 
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when he explored the changing nature of the ‘public sphere’ in advanced capitalist societies. He 
understood the public sphere as an intermediate space between state and society, in which both 
participated, that could take a variety of forms: liberal, plebeian or regimented, for example. As 
he saw it, the liberal bourgeois public sphere, formed in opposition to the state, was transformed 
with the advent of the welfare state and the parallel development of mass society and 
advertising. In this process: ‘[S]tate intervention in the sphere of society found its counterpart in 
the transfer of public functions to private corporate bodies. Likewise, the opposite process of a 
substitution of public authority by the power of society was connected to the extension of public 
authority over sectors of the private realm’ (Habermas as quoted in Huang 1993: 218). This, he 
described as the ‘societalisation’ of the state and the ‘statification’ of society, a process that 
undermines the intermediate space previously constituted by a particular public sphere. But 
Huang (1993: 219) observes that Habermas’s notion of private individuals coming together to 
form a public sphere in opposition to the regulatory regime of public authorities means that: 
‘The public sphere becomes merely an extension of (civil) society in its democratic 
development against the absolutist state’.   
To get around this reversion to a binary opposition of state and society, Huang (1993) 
developed the concept of a ‘third realm’ as conceptually distinct from state and society. It was 
intended as a value-neutral category with broader application than the historically-specific 
‘bourgeois public sphere’. Huang rejects the idea of multiple public spheres as too vague and 
instead looks for something that can be applied to a range of historico-social contests. The 
concept of ‘third realm’ was employed by Huang to analyse changes in state-society relations in 
post-revolutionary China: 
Beyond the boundaries of the expanded formal state apparatus, moreover, the party-state sought 
to extend its influence further by completely institutionalising much of the remaining third 
realm. Instead of relying on ad hoc collaboration between state and society, the party-state 
created institutional frameworks within which such collaboration was to take place. The purpose 
was to ensure the state’s influence in those spaces it acknowledged to be intermediate between 
state and society (Huang 1993: 232). 
This process involved both the penetration of existing institutions, such as the justice system, as 
well as new institutions such as rural collectives which were neither part of the bureaucratic 
state nor civil society (Huang 1993: 233). It is this conceptualisation that informs Huang’s 
(1993: 237) caution against expectations that a society long dominated by the party-state can 
rapidly develop societal organisations ‘genuinely separate and independent from the state’. 
Rather, the unfolding tensions in the third realm are the most likely dynamics to shape China’s 
political direction for the foreseeable future. Though Ding did not adopt the same sort of trinary 
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conception, his treatment of the ambiguous dimensions of state-society relations is not 
inconsistent with Huang’s ‘third realm’. 
Useful as this concept may potentially be in steering enquiry towards empirical studies of 
the intersection between state and society, we should be careful to scrutinise the concept more 
carefully before any wholehearted endorsement of it. In particular, to attribute to it the same 
analytical or political significance as the concept civil society would overstate the case. Even if 
one were persuaded by the notion that such an ambiguous realm exists and has general 
application, it does not necessarily follow that it carries equal weight in its implications for 
political opposition or the analysis thereof.
18
The idea that a modern, industrialised society can exist without a civil society, and indeed 
flourish economically, is a further point taken up briefly by Gellner (1994). He notes a 
frustration by conservatives in the established, industrialised liberal democracies who lament 
the absence of a holistic, moral community. According to Gellner, the inherently pluralistic 
nature of civil society simply cannot deliver what these conservatives demand. However, there 
are contemporary alternatives to civil society that are capable of offering the shared vision 
absent in civil society, in combination with industrialisation and economic development. He 
sees Islam in this light, addressing the spiritual and practical needs of a disoriented urban 
population experiencing development-related upheaval. But China, Singapore, Taiwan and 
Malaysia are also singled out as a group. As Gellner understands it, the problem of capitalist 
anomie is ameliorated in these societies via the discipline of authoritarian order from above and 
family networks from below which condition the individual’s experience of the market. Whilst 
the depiction of these societies as ones tightly-bonded by kinship may be somewhat idealised 
and culturalist, Gellner does at least recognise the possibility of sustainable political alternatives 
to civil society in conjunction with capitalist industrialisation. 
To reiterate, none of the above argument infers a normative indifference to the existence 
of civil society or advocates its downgrading in analytical terms.
19 It simply suggests the state 
versus civil society dichotomy should not be rigidly enforced if we are trying to conceptualise 
the full range of political contestations in any society, least of all one-party states or ‘dominant 
party systems’ which characterise much of East and Southeast Asia. Other political spaces are 
important because their existence conditions the character of opposition. The nature and 
significance of the co-option of societal forces through modifications to state institutions is thus 
an important area of investigation. To differing extents, this co-option introduces important 
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dynamics to the political process, including forms of contestation, that can affect the content of 
public policy.     
However, civil society, as a concept, must be preserved for specifying a particular form of 
political space. It cannot include all, independent, voluntary social organisations. Instead, a 
distinction must be drawn between civic and civil society, the latter involving regular attempts 
to advance the interests of members through overt political action. As Bernhard (1993: 308) 
emphasises, civil society requires ‘the existence of an independent public space from the 
exercise of state power, and then the ability of organisations within it to influence the exercise 
of state power’. Seen in this way, civil society is an inherently political sphere, of no less 
significance than formal political parties. For example the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) 
in Singapore is acutely aware of the inherently political nature of civil society, hence its 
adoption of legislation and a legal discourse intended to constrain the political activities of 
social and cultural organisations. 
A final observation about the concept of civil society concerns its extra-national 
dimensions. The theorisation of state-civil society relations has been overwhelmingly premised 
on the assumption that civil society, like state, is a fundamentally national phenomenon. Yet 
there are both international governmental organisations (IGOs) and international non-
governmental organisations (INGOs) which complicate the matter. International relations 
theory literature has for some time been interested in the former, but the latter have only 
recently attracted serious academic interest on any scale.
20 The emphasis in new social 
movements on the international character of feminist, environmentalist, human rights and other 
movements, has contributed to greater awareness of INGOs. Moreover, the recent accelerated 
growth of INGOs, now estimated at 23,000, simply compels more analytical attention (Alger 
1990: 159). Many of these outside the established centres of capitalist production involve 
developmental organisations of a grassroots nature. important debates have surfaced over the 
politicisation of the development process through some of these organisations. But there is also 
evidence of growing regional linkages between human rights, environmental and other activists 
in Asia (see Vatikiotis 1994). The extent to which political opposition is able to draw on the 
international support of like-minded communities - whether they be political parties or social 
movements - is obviously an important empirical question. But at what point do these links 
qualify as part of a ‘globalised’ or ‘international’ civil society? 
According to Lipschutz (1992: 398–9), we are witnessing the emergence of new political 
spaces as transnational networks of economic, social and cultural relations are formed for 
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specific social and political purposes by people united by common norms. This, he stresses, is 
qualitatively more than accelerated international social contact brought about by new 
technologies. Rather: ‘It is new forms of social organisation and social practice, and not 
hardware alone, that have global political effects’ (Lipschutz 1992: 413). These forms of 
organisation are diminishing the state’s political importance, and quite deliberately as Lipschutz 
(1992: 398–9) sees it: ‘This civil society is “global” not only because of those connections that 
cross national boundaries and operate within the “global, nonterritorial region”, but also as a 
result of a growing element of global consciousness in the way the members of global civil 
society act’.  
Whilst the state is by no means in its death throes, avenues for political contestation over 
the exercise of power are being opened up by the processes focused on by Lipschutz. The 
question is how significant are they and what are the preconditions for utilising them? In 
chapter eight, He Baogang embarks on a dedicated study of exiled Chinese oppositionists. In 
this case, international organisations and movements are mounted from abroad. He finds, 
however, that whilst they are effective in shaping international opinion and influencing host 
governments, the impact of these groups is ultimately restrained by severance from 
domestically-based movements and organisations.    
CONCLUSION 
Given the enormity of the social transformations in East and Southeast Asia resulting from 
rapid capitalist industrialisation, it is indeed reasonable to anticipate political changes. 
However, if we are to ascertain and specify those changes, it is necessary to adopt a theoretical 
framework that does not lock out of consideration possibilities that may differ from the 
historical experiences of earlier industrialising capitalist societies, and our own normative 
preferences. The triumph of liberal democracy is but one possibility for these societies, and not 
necessarily the most likely. Political oppositions consistent with this model are thus not the only 
oppositions emerging in the dynamic, late-industrialising societies in East and Southeast Asia. 
As we have seen above, there are some common themes to oppositions, and the 
circumstances shaping them, in the industrialising countries of East and Southeast Asia. In 
particular, economic and social transformations associated with rapid industrialisation have 
precipitated political accommodations involving changes in state-society relations throughout 
the region. However, what is striking is the diversification in the forms of these 
accommodations. There is a differential mix, importance and complexion of political parties, 
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social movements, NGOs, and co-opted social organisations unfolding that is giving definition 
to political oppositions in the respective societies in the region. We should expect the 
contrasting mixes in the forms and substances of oppositions in each society to produce even 
more divergent political trajectories as capitalist industrialisation consolidates. 
    The relative importance and character of civil society is an important part of this 
differentiation. However, oppositions eeking out a measure of independent political space need 
not be bearers of liberal democratic values or architects of political liberalism. Indeed, their 
attempts to affect political change are often premised on the retention of elitist and hierarchical 
structures. But rather than diminishing their significance as political oppositions, this may 
afford greater latitude to openly contest the exercise of state power. Similarly, authorities are 
able to shape the direction of civil society to encourage elements that do not challenge the 
fundamental social and political order. Indeed, if the prospects of civil society are in some cases 
brighter now in parts of East and Southeast Asia than two decades ago, it has much to do with 
the moderating influence of new social forces limiting their criticisms to the detail rather than 
the essence of the economic and social system. It is precisely because this time opposition is 
less fundamental, particularly where it involves an expanded civil society, that it is more likely 
to be sustainable over the longer term. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
*    I am grateful to Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison, Chua Beng Huat and two anonymous 
referees for their constructive criticisms on an earlier draft of this work. Thanks also to Amanda 
Miller for her copy editing. 
1  Increasingly, with the focus on leadership in particular, voluntarism is emphasised in the acounts 
of whether or not the preconditions for change are actually realised. Diamond (1989: 3), in an 
acknowledgement of the transitions volumes, states that ‘the choices, decisions, values, and 
actions of political and institutional leaders have figured prominently - and in many cases, quite 
clearly decisively - in the decline or fall of democracy’. He contends that, in the democratic 
prospects of Asian countries,   ‘effective and democratically-committed leadership’ is of crucial 
importance (Diamond 1989, p. 49). 
2   There are of course variants within these two extremes, referred to by Dahl as mixed regimes 
and competitive oligarchies. Mixed regimes afford a measure of space for select public 
contestation, including ‘loyal oppositions’, but barriers nevertheless exist to the full expression 
of political preferences. Competitive oligarchies are even more selective about the tolerance of 
opposition, excluding the bulk of the population which is unorganised and unrepresented but 
allowing some contestation amongst elites (Dahl 1973, pp. 14--5). 
3  Barker (1971, p. 26) draws on the following quote from Dahl to illustrate the problem:‘Today 
one is inclined to regard the existence of an opposition party as very nearly the most distinctive 
characteristic of democracy itself; and we take the absence of an opposition party as evidence, if 
not always conclusive proof, for the absence of democracy’. 
4  Linz distinguishes between legal semi-opposition and alegal and illegal opponents who operate 
outside the system. Alegal opposition ‘refers to opponents whose activities, without being 
strictly illegal, have no legal sanction and run counter to the spirit if not the text of the 
Constitution and laws of the regime. They are outside the law: alegal’ (Linz 1973, p 191). 
5  Linz mainaitns that semi-opposition is largely interest-based rather than structural. Despite 
occasional pretentions to the contrary, this opposition does not question the basic assumptions of 
the regime (Linz 1973, p. 191). As such, it is limited in the ability to foster genuinely alternative 
programmes. 
6  In Huntington’s book The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (1991), 
he not only identifies a new global surge in the direction of liberal democracy since the mid-
1970s, he also warns that previous waves of ‘democratisation’ have been followed by a wave of 
reversions to authoritarian rule. On this point, Dahl (1994: 18) clearly sees culture as strategic in 
resisting any undemocratic or anti-democratic impulses: ‘Whenever a country develops an 
advanced market oriented society its people will be provided with many structures, incentives, 
skills, and opportunities that are favourable to democratic ideas and processes. But such a 
development does not by any means insure that they will possess a democratic culture and 
common identity that are strong enough to avoid severe crises or conflict, or maintain 
democracy when they occur.’ 
7  According to Schmitter and Karl (1991: 82), the challenge in trying to establish liberal 
democracy ‘is not so much to find a set of goals that command widespread consensus as to find 
a set of rules that embody contingent consent’. For them, all liberal democracies involve a 
measure of political uncertainty owing to institutionalised competition. But the rules of 
competition limit the bounds of that uncertainty.  
8  On the basis of her observations on different regimes in the region, Chan (1993, pp. 21--24) also 
posits the notion of an ‘Asian democracy’. This involves free elections but characteristically has 
the following distinguishing features: a communitarian sense which locates the individual within 
the group; a greater acceptance of and respect for authority and hierarchy; a dominant-party 
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system rather than a competitive party system; and a centralised bureaucracy and strong state. 
According to Chan (1993: 25), ‘indigenous cultures and folkways are impossible to erase, which 
is why we should not expect transplanted political institutions to look exactly like their 
antecedants and to function in a similar way. Hence Asian democracy’.  
9  This latest position by Fukuyama comes in the wake of Kim Dae Jung’s (1994) rebuttal of Lee 
Kuan Yew’s widely-publicised insistence on the irreconcilability of liberal democracy and 
Confucianism. Kim effectively turned the cultural obstacle argument on its head, arguing that 
‘almost two thousand years before Locke, Chinese philosopher Meng-tzu preached similar 
ideas’ (Kim 1994, p. 191). According to Kim (1994, p. 192), whilst the basic ideas and traditions 
requisite for ‘democracy’ first emerged in Asia, it was the Europeans who first ‘formalized 
comprehensive and effective electoral democracy’.   
10  This is not to overlook the fact that the finer detail of his thesis has aroused considerable 
controversy. See, for example, Foreign Affairs, 72: 4 and Asian Studies Review, 18: 1, both of 
which contain various critical responses to Huntington’s thesis. 
11    Habermas (1984: 392), for example, argues that: ‘these new conflicts arise in domains of 
cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialisation’ and ‘The new problems have to do 
with quality of life, equal rights, individual self-realization, participation, and human rights’. 
Moreover, Crook et al. (1993, p. 151) underline that the values per se of NSMs are not as 
significant as the insistence that they serve as the uncompromising measure of all institutional 
and political behaviour, both in civil society and formal state institutions. Young (1994, p. 84) 
argues that this emphasis on values makes NSMs difficult to reconcile with the liberal pluralist 
model of rational, self-interested individuals or collectives. Rather, ideas and principles that 
cannot be deduced from socio-economic position or material self-interest play a major role. 
12  NSM organisations are depicted as: small, locally-based groups; organised around specific 
issues; having wild fluctuations in the levels of activity; often with fluid hierarchies and lacking 
–clear systems of authority. These characteristics lead Scott (1990, p. 30) to suggest it might be 
more appropriate to use the term ‘social networks’ rather than organisations when describing 
NSMs. Importantly, the disparate nature of social movements militates against their mobilisation 
as a coherent oppositional force with a programmatic alternative. Some NSM theorists have 
looked to the ecology movement as possibly having the potential to transcend this. Here it is the 
rejection of technocracy and its support institutions and values, rather than capitalism, which is 
seen as the motivation for radical change (see Scott 1990, p. 30). 
13  According to Habermas (1987, pp. 358-9), ‘The lifeworld is the unspecified reservoir from 
which the subsystems of the economy and state extract what they need for their reproduction: 
performance at work and obedience’. 
14  Crook et al. (1993, pp. 163-4), acknowledge the dilution effect of the above processes on NSMs, 
but nevertheless insist that NSMs represent an irreversible change for the politics of 
industrialised societies in favour of increased diversity of political processes: more open 
organisational structures, more diverse elites, more fluid and fragmented alliances and loyalties, 
and more complex networks of communication.  
15  Schmitter (1992, p. 428) notes that competing theories and models of democracy emphasise 
particular institutional sites in advancing their cases, but argues that all are potentially 
democratic so long as ‘they respect the overarching principle of citizenship and the procedural 
minima of civil rights, fair elections ‘free associability etc.’. 
16  This is not to insist that we can simply differentiate the actual extent of state structures in Europe 
and North America from East and Southeast Asia. Arguably the biggest differences in state-
society relations from one case to another centres around the form or nature of the relationship 
rather than the extent of it. States are at all times extensively related to societies.  
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17  Stepan (1985, p. 340) makes the complementary point that the evolution of political opposition 
to the state within society is shaped by the way in which the state defines its project and by the 
contradictions and conflicts that emerge inside the state apparatus itself. 
18  This point was forcefully and convincingly made by Chua Beng Huat in reaction to an earlier 
draft. 
19  Some theorists, such as Tester (1992) and Kumar (1993), do see cases for abandoning the 
concept. Tester –argues against the use of the concept civil society on the grounds that it is 
essentially a construct of modernity and thus carries with it questionable assumptions about an 
objective, external reality: ‘The modern imaginations of civil society are based on a series of 
problems and possibilities which means that they are largely inadequate for the tasks of 
interpreting and creating maps of post-modernity. Civil society will only continue to be accepted 
as a satisfactory imagination to the extent that it can continue to provide easy and comforting 
answers to easy and irrelevant questions’ (as quoted in Reitzes 1994, p. 103). Kumar believes 
too much wasted energy has accompanied the renewed interest and faith in the concept of civil 
society. For him, ‘The establishment of a democratic polity and a public sphere of political 
debate and political activity are the primary conditions for a thriving civil society of independent 
associations and an active civil life’ (Kumar 1993, p. 391). This suggests that it is to the 
institutions of the state and the reconstitution of the functioning political society that attention 
should be focused. This position is not inconsistent with the ‘new institutionalism’.  
20  Ironically, as Ghils (1992, p. 417) points out, transnational phenomena such as religious 
movements pre-date the institution of the state itself.  
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